Asian Bamboo [AB5]: Fair Value Valuation of biological assets

Asian Bamboo AG (AB) is a holding company listed in Germany. Its assets are located in China, operations consist of bamboo farms. The farms produce:

• Bamboo Trees
• Spring shoots (sold fresh or canned)
• Winter shoots 

As AB is a company listed on a European Stock market it has to report for its group accounts according to IFRS. For biological assets, being the main purpose of the group, IAS 41 is applicable.
IAS 41 is a full fair value standard, it requires assets being valued at Fair Value less cost to sell (FVLTCS).

I compiled all the information given about the valuation process in their annual reports from 2007-2012 in the following table:

As it can be seen (yellow) an important changed happened in 2010. AB5 restated a lot of figures, most importantly the way they account for biol. assets:

• Now they included more comprehensive costs (land lease, recultivation)
• For the first time the fair value of biol. assets decreases (by around 30 Mil. Due to IAS 8 this doesn't show up in the p/l, only mentioned in notes)
• At the same time they increase the count of trees/ha by around 4 times. Potentially decreasing the loss connected with increased costs.
• Furthermore in the corresponding section of the notes there is no mention of their "independent" valuer anymore. Also later the display of the auditor is only a side notice outside the core report.

As we saw the effect of the restatement was balanced by an increase in (assumed) output of trees per ha. However if we take a look on the historical output on the following table 2 this assumption seems questionable:

Bamboo trees per ha sold in 2012 was 115 compared to 2.369 according to the FVLCTS calculation.
That is about 25 times actual//planned.
Apart from bamboo trees however the estimations of 2012 for spring/winter shoots seem more realistic.
This leads to the following conclusion:

1. Inputs (allmost all lvl 3 FVs, btw.) used seem overly (grotesque?) optimistic.
2. Inputs are realistic, however demand for trees is so low that the produced amount of trees cannot be sold.
3. inputs are realistic, demand is out there however AB has troubles with harvesting all the mature bamboo trees.
4. Mix of 1., 2. and/or 3.

The Management Report 2012 (p. 46) states negative impact on housing and construction. Also p. 63 stats AB think they can sell all shoots they harvest, that also means they can not do the with the trees.
However it seems mainly the reduced sells to Zhongzhu, a bamboo fiber manufacturer, a responsible for the shortfall. AB sees demand for fiber as key driver for tree sells (p. 63.
The business relations are like this:

•  Zhongzhu as OEM manufacturer buys bamboo trees from AB
• AB then purchases processed bamboo fibers back from  Zhongzhu . 
•  Zhongzhu is "strategic partner" since 2009 (loan from AB, non-interest bearing: 2,1 Mil. EUR)
•  Zhongzhu only need younger, low quality trees (=lower price?) 
•  Zhongzhu seems extremly sensitive to changes in business  environment ("minimal production volumes" in 2012)  

A similar investment (40% stake) in Xinlifeng (plywood) already failed, stake sold in 2013 at "about book value".
To me the theme seems recurring. Invest in "strategic partner" via equity/non interest bearing debt injection. First 1/2 years high tree sale volume, then decrease and exit.

It appears there is barely demand for bamboo tree based products. Initiatives to increase demand from AB are short-lived and initialized by capital injections.
Massive decrease of biological assets due to revaluation can be expected.
On the positive side estimations and sales for shoots seem fair (in 2012). However as of Q3.13 sales of shoots also fell drastically (more than - 60%).

Might make a follow-up on this with my own DCF valuation of biological assets, so i can compare it when the annual report 2013 gets released (no date of release yet).